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At the microscopic level, printing on a substrate exhibits imperfections that can be used as a unique
identifier for labels, documents and other printed items.  In previous work, we have demonstrated using
these minute imperfections around a simple forensic mark such as a single printed character for robust
authentication of the character with a low cost (and mobile) system. This approach allows for product
authentication even when there is only minimal printing (e.g. on a small label or medallion), supporting a
variety of secure document workflows. In this paper, we present an investigation on the influence that the
substrate type has on the imperfections of the printing process that are used to derive the character
"signature".  We also make a comparison between two printing processes, dry electro photographic process
(laser) and (thermal) inkjet. Understanding the sensitivity of this approach is important so that we know the
limitations of the approach for document forensics.
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ABSTRACT 
At the microscopic level, printing on a substrate exhibits 
imperfections that can be used as a unique identifier for labels, 
documents and other printed items.  In previous work, we have 
demonstrated using these minute imperfections around a simple 
forensic mark such as a single printed character for robust 
authentication of the character with a low cost (and mobile) 
system. This approach allows for product authentication even 
when there is only minimal printing (e.g. on a small label or 
medallion), supporting a variety of secure document workflows. 
In this paper, we present an investigation on the influence that the 
substrate type has on the imperfections of the printing process that 
are used to derive the character ‘signature’.  We also make a 
comparison between two printing processes, dry electro 
photographic process (laser) and (thermal) inkjet. Understanding 
the sensitivity of our methods to these factors is important so that 
we know the limitations of the approach for document forensics. 
Categories and Subject Descriptors 
I.4.1 [Image Processing and Computer Vision]: Digitization and 
Image Capture—Scanning.  I.4.10  [Image Processing and 
Computer Vision]:  Image Representation—Statistical.  K.6.5 
[Management of Computing and Information Systems]: 
Security and Protection—Authentication. 
General Terms 
Algorithms, Security 
Keywords 
Security, Forensics, Model Matching, Document  Fraud, High-
resolution Imaging. 
1.  INTRODUCTION 
Forensic analysis of printed material including documents, 
packaging and labels, can be classified into two broad categories: 
1) device forensics/ballistics [1]-[3] where a document (or set of 
documents) is analyzed to see if it was printed on a specific device 
or class of devices; 2) print forensics [4]-[7] wherein individual 
printed artifacts are uniquely identified. This second class, which 
is of interest here, allows the differentiation of  individual 
instances of the same or highly similar documents - including high 
quality copies. For the majority of printing technologies unique 
properties result from the unrepeatable statistical aspects of the 
print process itself and the  interaction with  the underlying 
structural properties of the substrate material on which it is 
printed. Thus a forensic mark can be any form of glyph, character 
or printed shape of sufficient size to carry information to 
determine if the forensic mark under investigation is the exact 
same unique forensic mark that was previously printed [8]. In this 
way, print is used as a security mechanism preventing the 
counterfeit and copy of documents and product packaging [9]. 
We have previously [10] demonstrated a low-cost USB-powered 
mini-appliance capable of resolving 3.5 microns (7257 dpi) with 
1:1 magnification. This is accomplished using a Dyson relay lens 
which comprises a single refractive surface in series with a mirror 
and a low cost 3M  pixel CMOS image sensor. With a self-
contained (white LED) illumination source, this Dyson relay 
CMOS imaging device (Dr CID) affords the capture of individual 
typed characters with printing “parasitics”—such as the 
absorbance of ink into the fibers of the substrate (e.g. paper, 
cardstock, etc.) along with the droplet “tails” that exhibit micro-
random aberrations.  The laser process has different characteristics 
such as toner particle size variation, splatter, charge bleed etc.    
In [11]-[13] we adopted a model-based approach that separates 
the truly random part of the outline of the individual printed 
character, which we termed a model based signature profile 
(MBSP), from the shared shape-conveying component. We 
showed that the MBSP allows forensic  (highly statistically 
significant) levels of authentication to be achieved (even in the 
case where multiple imaging modalities are employed). 
Furthermore for many forensic marks the MBSP is extracted in an 
order fixed by the frame of reference defined by the model. This 
in turn allowed the introduction (see [12], [13]) of a simple fixed 
order shape warp descriptor (which is typically less than a few 
hundred bits long)  which is  extracted from the MBSP. This is 
more compact than the MBSP and easier to manipulate and yet 
retains most of the forensic authentication power of the former. 
In this paper, we present an investigation on the influence that the 
substrate type has on the imperfections of the printing process that 
are used to derive the character ‘signature’.  We also make a 
comparison between two printing processes, dry electro 
photographic process (laser) and (thermal) inkjet. Understanding 
the sensitivity of our methods to these factors is important so that 
we know the limitations of the approach for document forensics. 
It is also important so that we can determine how many printed 
characters are required to forensically identify a document. We 
also go beyond previous work and show that it is possible to base 
authentication entirely on an analysis of the substrate material in 
the vicinity of the printed character. 
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 2.  METHOD 
2.1  Model Based Signature Profiles (MBSP) 
We define our models simply as a set of N uniformly spaced 
points (x, y coordinates) defining the outer edge of a character 
glyph and  associated unit normal vectors.  Figure  1a shows an 
illustration of a model of the outer contour of a Times Roman 
lowercase ‘a’. The process of MBSP extraction is illustrated in the 
remainder of figure 1  (see  also  [13] for details).  Importantly 
during the extraction of the profile image 1e it is preferable to 
low-pass filter the underlying image 1b using a standard Gaussian 
convolution kernel. This has the effect of removing imaging noise 
and more importantly avoiding sampling artifacts. 
 
Figure 1. Illustrates, for a Times Roman 12 point ‘a’, the 
extraction of a MBSP. Where: (a) is a simplified model for the 
outline of the character composed of 100 feature points shown 
with associated normals (note that in practice to avoid 
sampling artifacts models are an order of magnitude more 
dense than shown in this figure; 2000 model points are used in 
the experiments presented in this paper); (b) is a  900x800 
(wide x tall) image of a 12 point character captured by Dr 
CID; (c) shows superimposed transformed model; (d) shows 
the loci of sampled regions for the extracted normal profile 
images in (e). Each column of (e) corresponds to sampling on a 
vector between the loci along the normal vector for each 
individual (x, y) contour point of the model; Finally (f) shows 
the MBSP extracted from (e). 
Many methods can be used to recover the signature profile from 
the profile image, including simple thresholding or maximum 
edge detection. We have found the following grayscale edge 
metric that combines all the data in the profile image to work well. 
For each column in the profile image the signature profile is 
defined as: 
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 where  eij  is an edge strength corresponding to the digital 
derivative of the profile image along the column i  and  wj is a 
windowing function (in our case a Gaussian with standard 
deviation ¼ the column height centered on the mid-point of the 
column). Dividing by a normalizing sum of windowed absolute 
edge strength results in a measure that achieves robustness to both 
scene content and illumination variation. 
2.2  Shape Warp Coding (SWC) 
Introduced in [12] for micro-color-tile inspection and generalized 
in [13] for any printed forensic mark (provided a suitably irregular 
shape for which the matching process recovers a unique model 
location) the SWC is derived from the MBSP as follows. First we 
divide the signature profile into N equal length segments. Then 
for each, compute a sum squared error (SSE) of the residual 
(which is akin to a local variance): 
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where pi is the signature profile in the segment j and μj is the mean 
value  of that profile over the whole of the  segment. We then 
compute the mean value (or alternatively the median) of this error 
metric, SSEmean, over all N segments. This provides us with an 
atomic unit of encoding (a “digit”) and it is possible to use it to 
form an N-position string which is the SWC: 
mean
j
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where║.║is a rounding function. The SDED, for comparing the 
SWCs of any two forensic marks, is thus defined as: 
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where Tmax is an optional threshold to improve robustness. The 
SDED can be considered a form of modified Hamming Distance 
where the expected value of SWC(*) is 1 at each digit due to the 
normalization process described. For example, a pair of SWCs 
(N=50) extracted from Dr CID data for the same printed ‘a’ and 
their absolute difference are: 
SWC1 = 11011111201101111211211121111110112121121111010111 
SWC2 = 11111111210100101211211121112110111111121111011210 
DIFF = 00100000011001010000000000001000001010000000001101 
for which the SDED is 11 (or 0.22 when normalized by N). 
3.  EXPERIMENTS 
In this section, we report the results of 2 experiments. The first 
applies the previously presented methodology (outlined in section 
2)  to  a number of substrate types and includes  both laser and 
thermal inkjet prints where appropriate. The second set of 
experiments involves  substrate-only comparisons using a 
modified form of the SWC where the SSE is replaced by the 
variance of the substrate in the top quartile of an extended profile 
image (chosen to ensure that the region over which the variance is 
measured is not close to the intentionally inked part of the print). 
Thus, for the latter experiment, the sole purpose of the model is to 
provide  a unique frame of reference to allow consistent 
measurement of the properties of the substrate. After considering a wide range of paper types we chose to test 6 
distinct types; 5 for laser (HP  80g office, HP 160g Matte, HP 
200g Photo Matte, HP 120g Soft Gloss and Handmade Lokta by 
Wild Paper) and 3 for inkjet (HP 80g office, HP Premium Photo 
Glossy and Handmade Lokta) with two  in common. These 
represent a broad cross-section of the paper types available. The 
laser printer used was an HP CP6015 and the inkjet was an HP 
K5400 and the printers were configured for the specific paper 
type being used. 
For each print/paper-type combination we printed  40 Times 
Roman 12 point letter ‘a’s. Each is scanned twice using different 
Dr CID devices resulting in 640 individual images. Examples of 
each are shown in figure 2. 
 
Figure2. Top left to bottom right are Laser HP 6015 on Soft 
Gloss, Photo Matte, Handmade, Matte and Office, followed by 
inkjet HP K5400 on Office, Handmade and Premium Photo. 
 
Figure 3. Plots SDED values for 40 veridical matches (red) and 
40 random false matches (blue) for CP6015 laser print on 80g 
office paper. The sigma of Gaussian smoothing was 5.0.  
3.1  Substrate Comparison 
The first set of experiments use the standard methodology 
outlined in section 2. In each experiment the 40 SWC’s derived 
from printed letters  captured  by  one Dr  CID device are each 
compared with an SWC derived from the same printed character 
captured with the other Dr CID device (veridical match) and with 
a random incorrectly matching SWC (false match) also captured 
with the second device (for the same print/substrate combination). 
The SDED values that result from one such experiment (laser on 
80g plain paper) are shown in figure 3. It is clear from this figure 
that the distribution of SDED values of the veridical matches is 
well separated from that of the false matches. 
Summary statistics (means with standard deviation error bars) of a 
series of such experiments are shown in figure 4 for our 8 print 
and paper combinations. Of these only the Handmade Lokta (for 
both  laser and inkjet) shows significantly different distribution 
statistics to those illustrated in figure 3. 
 
Figure 4. Plots mean SDED values and standard deviation 
error bars for veridical and false matches for each paper/print 
combination. The sigma of Gaussian smoothing was 5.0. 
 
Figure 5. Plots approximate Z-score trend against the Sigma 
used in low-pass filter for each paper/print combination. 
If we assume that the distributions of veridical and false matches 
are Gaussian (for which we have presented compelling evidence 
in [13]) then we can use an approximate a Z-score (approximate 
as these are small sample, rather than population, statistics) to 
measure the separation of the two populations: 
( ) F V F V S S Z σ σ + − =  
that is the absolute difference of the mean SDED scores for 
veridical and false matches divided by the sum of their standard 
deviations. The relationship between Z-score and the probability 
of false-positive/negative is highly non-linear, while a Z-score of 
3 corresponds to a probability of 0.001 a Z-score of 6 relates to a 
probability of 10
-9. Figure 5 shows how approximate Z-scores 
vary with the degree of low-pass filtering applied to image during 
the construction of the profile image –  illustrating the need to 
overcome sampling artifacts for effective matching. Note that a 
sigma of 5.0 results in Z-scores above 6.0 for all but the 
handmade paper types. 3.2  Substrate Authentication 
As discussed in the introduction to this section the second set of 
experiments  investigates the use of  substrate variance alone  to 
achieve forensic authentication.  Figure 6 shows summary 
statistics for each of the 8 paper types. Remarkably the results are 
very similar to those of figure 4 which included both ink/toner 
and substrate in the region under analysis.  Only the Premium 
Photo Glossy inkjet paper is significantly  impaired  due to its 
highly uniform and specular surface properties. 
 
Figure 6. Substrate only plot of mean SDED values and 
standard deviation error bars for veridical and false matches 
for each paper/print combination (Sigma 5.0). 
Figure 7 shows for the  substrate only experiments the Z-score 
trend with the degree of low-pass filtering. In this case there are 
more significant relationships that are paper specific. Most 
surprising is the large difference between the two 80g office 
papers  –  given that this experiment uses only the substrate for 
SDED comparisons we would expect the identical paper types to 
give identical results. However for all the laser printed documents 
the substrate will inevitably include flecks of stray toner that add 
to the microscopic texture that is measured in the analysis of the 
Dr CID images.   
4.  DISCUSSION 
Our results show that for the majority of print and substrate 
combinations forensic levels of authentication can be achieved 
with the analysis of a single Dr CID image of a single printed 
character whether or not the ink/toner mass of the character is 
included in the analysis. This is a significant and interesting result 
that adds to our understanding of print/substrate as a forensic 
signature of an individual document. In those cases where the 
statistical significance is reduced it is necessary to use a number 
of printed characters to achieve forensic-level identification. In 
general, if the probability of a false positive identification for a 
given character is p, and the desired forensic-level certainty is F, 
then n characters are required to achieve forensic-level certainty 
governed by the equation: 
p
n = F 
So, if p=0.022 (as is the case for a Z-score of 2) and F=10
-9, then 
we need 6  characters (that is, n=5.4) to achieve forensic-level 
validation of inkjet print on handmade paper - which while being 
richly  textured is also highly specular and hence a  small 
difference in the capture conditions tends to dominate the image 
statistics. 
 
Figure 7. Substrate only plot of Z-score against the Sigma used 
in low-pass filter for each paper/print combination. 
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